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iv

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:
CaseNo.20050282-CA

ADAM KYLE PRICE,

:

Defendant/Appellant

:

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). The appellant, Adam Kyle Price was convicted of aggravated
assault, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (2004), a second degree felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Whether Price's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel when he
(a) attempted to introduce evidence of three prior convictions involving violence to
establish the chief prosecution witness's violent propensities and to rebut the victim's
testimony as to peaceful tendencies without certified copies of the convictions on the first
day of trial; (b) failed to ensure the witness's appearance on the second day of trial
despite the court's order requiring the witness to make himself available; (c) failed to
request a continuance on the second day of trial after discovering that the witness was not
present; (d) failed to inquire into what role, if any, the state's case manager played in the
witness's unavailability; (e) obtained admissible evidence of only one of three of the
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witness's assault convictions; and, (f) effectively failed to mention the exhibits reflecting
directly upon Ihe chief prosecution witness's credibility and violent character during
closing argument when those exhibits were admitted without any comment or testimony
that would have highlighted their relevance.
Standard of Review:
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, fffa defendant must
show (1) that counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient
performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial
would have been different.'"
Myers v. State. 2004 UT 31, ^ 20, 94 P.3d 211, quoting Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT
72, ^f 19, 61 P. 3d 978 (additional citation omitted). The reviewing court presumes the
challenged actions were sound trial strategy. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah
1990).
Preservation: This issue is appropriately raised for the first time on appeal when
the defendant is represented by counsel other than trial counsel, and the trial record is
adequate to permit a decision on the issue. State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 n.l (Utah
Ct. App. 1994), citing State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is attached as Addendum C.
Article ], § 12 of the Utah Constitution is attached as Addendum D.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (2004) is attached as Addendum E.
Utah R. Evid. 405 is attached as Addendum F.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 3, 2004, an Information was filed charging Price with one count of
aggravated assault in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (2004), a second degree
felony, and one count of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (2004), a class B misdemeanor. (R. 1-2.) Price's case, No.
041903671 FS, was linked to the case of Jared Mead Gillett, No. 041903672 FS, as both
Price and Gillett were alleged to have assaulted Thomas Armijo. (R. 34.) A preliminary
hearing was held October 7, 2004. The unlawful possession charge against Price was
dismissed, and he was bound over with co-defendant Gillett for trial on the assault
charges. (R. 47-48.) A jury trial was held January 6, 7 and 10, 2005. Price and Gillett
were found guilty of aggravated assault in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103
(2004). (R. 93.) On March 14, 2005, Price was sentenced to spend from one to fifteen
years at the Utah State Prison, pay a fine of $18,500, and pay restitution in the amount of
$11,693; the prison sentence and fine were suspended, and Price was placed on three
years probation with 365 days in jail. (R. 104-107; the Sentence/Judgment/Commitment/
Order is attached hereto as Addendum A.) Price's Notice of Appeal was filed March 24,
2005. (R. 109.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The afternoon of May 28, 2004 began with Adam Price's co-defendant, Jared
Gillett, selling plasma for money to buy alcohol. He was joined in the selling of plasma
by Thomas Armijo. (R. 132, at 276:2-9.) Gillett then went to his sister's house where he
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was joined by Price. (R. 132, at 276:6-277:8.) Gillett and Price shared a full bottle of
whiskey. (R. 132, at 277:17-20.) Armijo then arrived, after which he and Gillett walked
to a trailer located a short distance from the house where they drank from a bottle of rum,
most of which Armijo had already consumed. (R. 132, at 277:21-278: L0.) Gillett
returned to the house for a short while before leaving to buy beer; Armijo initially went to
EO's, a nearby pool hall, and then returned to the house while Gillett was still off buying
beer. (R. 132, at 279:25-280:14.)
Several altercations between Armijo and Price led up to the one that gave rise to
the assault charges. Each witness, especially Armijo and Price, gave varying accounts of
each, thus putting their credibility squarely at issue as the state alleged assault and Price
claimed self defense. The first skirmish between Price and Armijo occurred shortly after
Armijo's return to the house. (R. 132, at 280:15-20.) Armijo says he 'tapped" Price
farewell on the shoulder, to which Price took exception. Armijo says he told Price to "go
ahead and hit me back," upon which Price slugged him in the jaw. (R. 131, at 74:14-23.)
Price says he was telling Armijo that he could not box due to a shoulder injury when
Armijo knocked him to the ground with a combination of punches. Price got to his feet
and hit Armijo once. (R. 132, at 338:16-339:19.)
Then, according to Armijo, he was leaving the house to avoid more conflict when
Priced chased after him. They wrestled before Gillett intervened to help restrain Price.
Armijo walked across the street. (R. 131, 79:24-80:9.) Price says that before Armijo
went across the street, Armijo charged and started hitting him. (R. 132, 340:1-2.)
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On the other side of the street, Armijo says he saw Price approaching so he left
before there was more fighting. Armijo says he saw Price and Gillett return to the house.
(R. 131, at 80:8-13.) Price says he walked across the street to ask Armijo about his
behavior, and that more punches were exchanged. (R. 132, at 340:7-21.)
Armijo went back to the pool hall, and Price and Gillett returned to the house.
Soon thereafter, Price and Gillett were walking down the street that runs in front of the
pool hall to a gas station. (R. 132, at 341:1-16.) This is where the final confrontation
occurred. Price says they were walking past the pool hall when Armijo came up from
behind them, calling them "mother f-

," and challenging them to a fight. Price says

Armijo started swinging and immediately connected with several punches. Price felt
threatened with serious bodily injury based upon the fights earlier that day. (R. 132, at
342:1-343:24.) Armijo claims that upon leaving the pool hall, Price and Gillett
approached him, sprayed him in the face with mace, hit him in the head with a miniature
bat, and beat him up. (R. 131, at 83:4-85:15.)
Armijo was the state's first witness. During his testimony, counsel for Gillett
asked a question about something Armijo could not recall. Gillett's attorney refreshed
Armijo's recollection by having Armijo read from the preliminary hearing transcript. (R.
131, at 98:2-99:11.) Moments later, Armijo conceded he could not remember the details
of the fights that immediately preceded the one from which the assault charges stemmed.
(This was following Armijo's claims of never being the aggressor in those prior fights,
which testimony is summarized, supra.) He contended, however, that he would never
have started any of those fights because he is a peaceful man: "that ain't my style to do
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that. That ain't my class to do that. ... Yeah, it ain't, it ain't in my character to be violent
or aggressive, no." (R. 131, at 102:9-103:1; see also R. 131, at 106:12 ["I'm a spiritual,
peaceful guy, yeah."])
Under cross examination by Price's attorney about Armijo's self-proclaimed nonviolent character, the following exchange occurred when Price's attorney attempted to
confront Armijo with evidence of prior convictions for assault:
Q. Mr. Armijo, I have a few questions for you. Now, you just stated it's
not in your character to be violent, correct?
A. Exactly, (inaudible) provoked, unless someone hits me, then I'll
defend myself and I don't think that's being violent.
Q. Let's talk about some previous things that have happened to you in
your life.
A. Can he do that?
Q. Now, you have been convicted of a violent act before, right?
A. No, I haven't.
Q. You have never been convicted of a violent act?
A. I've been charged but never convicted.
Price's attorney: If I may approach, Your Honor.
The Court: Sure.
Q. I'm handing you what's been marked Defendant's Exhibit 1, 2 and 3.
Just take a look at the second page of Defendant's Exhibit No. 1.
A. I can't even read this, sorry.
Q. Let me ask you a specific - you can't read it at all?
A. No, I can't.
6

(R. 131, at 103:6-104:1.)
Price's attorney then sought to rebut Armijo's claim of nonviolent character
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(5)(d) (2004)(regarding claims of self defense, the
trier of fact may consider another's prior violent acts in determining imminence of force,
and reasonableness of the defendant's response thereto) with evidence of several prior
assault convictions. Armijo, however, denied any recollection of the convictions, and
claimed not to be able to read the documents offered to refresh his recollection. (R. 131,
at 104:2-105:11.) Armijo said the reason he could not read the documents was because of
blurry and double vision caused by the assault. (R. 131, at 120:1-5.)
Following a sidebar, the jury was excused. Price's attorney intended to refresh
Armijo's recollection as to the convictions by reading from Armijo's rap sheet.1 The
state, based upon prior communications with defense counsel, did not object to the use of
prior convictions for the purpose of rebutting claims of a peaceful character, but it did
object to the use of a rap sheet instead of certified copies of the convictions. The court
ruled that Price's attorney could, outside the presence of the jury, read aloud from the rap
sheet to refresh Armijo's recollection of the prior convictions. If, however, Armijo still
denied any recollection of the convictions, the attorney could not introduce the rap sheet
as evidence, but could do so with certified copies of the convictions. (R. 131, at 120:21124:9.)

1

During this exchange, defense counsel initially and erroneously claimed to base his right
to introduce evidence of prior convictions upon Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (2004)(the
misdemeanor assault statute), rather than § 76-2-402 (2004)(the self defense statute).
7

Price's attorney attempted to refresh Armijo's recollection as to (1) a guilty plea
from April 1991 (the transcript states "inaudible" where, presumably, other details
regarding an assault conviction were read); (2) a guilty plea in October 1991 to the lesser
charge of assault in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1991), a class B
misdemeanor; and, (3) another guilty plea to the lesser charge of assault, a class B
misdemeanor, in November 1992. Armijo denied any recollection of these convictions.
(R. 131, at 124:9-125:12.)
Upon the jury's return, Price's attorney asked Armijo a few more questions.
Price's attorney told the court that he might want to call Armijo during Price's case-inchief the next day. The court instructed, "Mr. Armijo, you're free to leave but they may
get in touch with you and ask you to come back later on." (R. 131, at 129:9-130:24.)
Trial resumed the following day. Toward the conclusion of the morning session,
Price's attorney went outside the courtroom to locate Armijo so he could be recalled to
the stand. Armijo was not there. Price's attorney had not informed Armijo that his
attendance that day was required. Armijo, in fact, had appeared earlier that morning and
left a note with Salt Lake City Detective Nelson apparently stating that since his presence
was not required, he was leaving. After Price's counsel returned to the courtroom without
Armijo, the jury was excused and the following exchange occurred:
The Court: All right, counsel, you can be seated. I take it Mr. Armijo is
not outside?
Mr. Simms [Price's attorney]: That's correct. If I may approach?
The Court: Sure.

8

Mr. Simms: I've shown this to co-defendant's counsel and Mr. Bown as
well.
Mr. Bown (state's counsel): Mr. Armijo mentioned to Detective Nelson
that - or was it today?
Det. Nelson: Yes, sir, this morning when I first saw him.
Mr. Bown: That he did not get a communication yesterday and so
(inaudible).
The Court: Okay. I saw the note so....
Mr. Simms: Your Honor, if he's not going to be available, I just have a
portion of videotape of his testimony yesterday. I'd just like to submit that
in front of the jury.
(R. 132, at 326:7-23.) Price's attorney did not request a continuance to secure Armijo's
presence. Price's attorney did not request to voir dire or otherwise examine Det. Nelson,
the state's case manager at trial as to Det. Nelson's conversation with Armijo prior to
Armijo's departure.
The portion of the videotape referenced by Price's attorney was from the first day
of trial when Armijo refreshed his recollection from the preliminary hearing transcript.
Price's attorney intended to impeach Armijo's claim to be unable to read the rap sheet
that contained the prior convictions. (R. 132, at 327:3-13.) The short excerpt from the
video tape (Def. Ex. 5) was played for the jury without any explanation as to its
significance as illustrated by the following exchange:
The Court: Again, I'll note the [state's] objection but overrule it and
receive Exhibit 5. It's just a very brief clip from the videotape of his
testimony yesterday, is that correct?
(Defendant's Exhibit 5 received)
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Mr. Simms: That's correct.
The Court: We'll play that again for the jury.
Mr. Simms: Yes, can I set it up in terms of why or should I just play the
video only?
The Court: You can't be a witness for us here. I think you probably
have to just play the videotape.
(Whereupon the videotape of Mr. Armijo's testimony was played.)
The Court: Thank you. When the time comes, you can argue your
reasoning in showing that.
Mr. Simms: Thank you. Let me call Mr. Price, Adam Price.
(R. 132, at 336:25-337:15.)
In closing argument, however, Price's attorney's only reference to the video was,
at best, confusing. When discussing Armijo's violent propensities, Price's attorney said:
So we know he's violent and that he struck first and we know that he had a
violent history although he conveniently couldn't read - he could read when
Mr. Hogan [co-defendant's attorney] presented something to him and we
saw that on the videotape, but conveniently, he couldn't read when I was
presenting that to him.
(R. 132, at 403:13-18.) No further attempt was made to connect the videotape to the
impeachment.
By the second day of trial, Price's attorney had obtained a certified copy of one of
Armijo's three convictions. It was for the October 1991 assault. (Def. Ex. 4, attached as
Addendum B.) With the absence of Armijo, Defendant's Exhibit 4 was received and
published without any comment, testimony or explanation to the jury. (R. 132, at 336:216.) The closest Price's attorney came to mentioning Defendant's Exliibit 4 or Armijo's
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prior convictions for violent offenses during closing argument was the brief passage
quoted above (R. 132, at 403:13-18).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Price is constitutionally guaranteed the effective assistance of trial counsel when
defending against charges that threaten loss of liberty. Price received ineffective
assistance, however, because his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness.
Armijo's violent character was an essential element of Price's self-defense claim.
Despite the fact that it was not authenticated and likely contained prejudicial information
irrelevant to Armijo's violent character, Price's attorney arrived at court with only a rap
sheet, not certified copies of the assault convictions. When it was time to "prove up"
Armijo's convictions, he was unable to do so because he had not bothered to obtain
certified copies of the prior convictions.
At Price's attorney's request, the judge warned Armijo he would have to testify
again if Price's attorney requested that he do so. Price's attorney, however, made no such
request. So while Armijo appeared at court the next morning, he soon left. Price's
attorney did not request a continuance to secure Armijo's presence. Nor did Price's
attorney examine the state's case manager as to what role he played in Armijo's
departure.
Because Armijo was unavailable when it was time to impeach his claimed
inability to read from the rap sheet, the brief videotape was played that showed Armijo
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silently reading from a hearing transcript - without explanatory comment or testimony.
Because Armijo was unavailable when it was time to establish Armijo's violent
propensities, a single certified copy of one conviction was admitted and published
without explanatory comment or testimony.
Price's attorney did not have certified copies of the other two convictions.
Closing argument, therefore, was the only opportunity Price's attorney would have
to explain the significance of the video and the certified copy of the conviction. He
mentioned the video once in passing, and did not mention either the conviction or the
record thereof.
But for Price's attorney's substandard performance, there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. This was a case that
depended entirely upon credibility. It pitted the word of the co-defendants against that of
Armijo. The evidence was close. Anything bearing upon the Armijo's credibility could
have affected the verdict. Anything that accredited the reasonableness of Price's belief
that substantial force was required to thwart Armijo's imminent attack could have
affected the verdict. The lack of basic preparation by Price's attorney, along with the
attorney's failure to ensure Armijo's appearance the second day of trial, prevented the
jury from receiving and understanding this crucial evidence.
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ARGUMENT
Mr. Price Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel When Trial Counsel Failed to
Fully Exploit the State's Chief Witness's Credibility Before the Jury.
Both the federal and Utah Constitutions guarantee an accused's right to effective
assistance of counsel. U.S. Const, amends. VI and XIV; Utah Const. Art. I, § 12; see
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). A defendant claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel "must show (1) that counsel's performance was so deficient as to
fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient
performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have
been different.'1 State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, f 23, 84 P.3d 1183, quoting Wickham v.
Galetka, 2002 UT 72, \ 19, 61 P.3d 978.
Ineffective assistance sufficient to undermine confidence in a jury's verdict may
arise in numerous contexts. E.g., State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029-30 (Utah
1991)(failure to object to the prosecutor's comment to the jury regarding a witness's
invocation of her testimonial privilege); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 187-89 (Utah
1990)(failure to investigate the availability of prospective defense witnesses); State v.
Nelson, 2004 UT App 421, 3-5 (Memorandum Decision)(failure to file the required
statutory notice of alibi)(attached as Addendum G); State v. Bleazard, 2004 UT App 351,
4 (Memorandum Decision)(failure to provide adequate notice of defense witnesses and
failure to prepare a cautionary instruction to mitigate the prejudicial effect of evidence)
(attached as Addendum H); State v. Crestani, 111 P.2d 1085, 1090-92 (Utah Ct. App.
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1989)(failure to prepare defense witnesses and failure to review the records obtained by
the prosecution).
Below, Section A focuses upon trial counsel's substandard performance. Section
B examines the prejudice caused thereby.
A.

Trial Counsel's Performance Fell Below an Objective Standard of
Reasonableness.
Trial counsel's performance fell below an objective level of reasonableness when

he (1) had nothing but a rap sheet with which to challenge Armijo's claim of peaceful
character the first day of trial, (2) did not ensure Armijo's presence the second day of
trial, (3) did not request a continuance during which Armijo's presence could be secured,
(4) did not seek to question the state's case manager about his conversation with Armijo
just before Armijo left the courthouse to determine what role the state agent played in
Armijo's unavailability, (5) obtained the certified copy of only one of three convictions,
and (6) effectively failed to tie the videotaped impeachment and the certified conviction
to Armijo's lack of credibility and violent propensities during closing argument. Each of
these failings is addressed below.
Because ineffective assistance claims often fail upon speculation that trial counsel
may have based decisions on trial strategy - no matter how unwise such decisions appear
in retrospect - the likelihood that any of the following actions were tactical in nature is
also addressed. E.g., Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, f 20 ("the defendant must overcome
the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered
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sound trial strategy"), quoting Templin, 805 P.2d at 186, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689.
1. Failed to Have Certified Copies of the Convictions Ready,
Armijo's violent character was a theme central to Price's self defense claim.
Utah's self defense statute reads in pertinent part:
§ 76-2-402 (2004). Force in defense of person — Forcible felony defined
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when
and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to
defend himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of
unlawful force. However, that person is justified in using force intended or
likely to cause death or serious bodily injury only if he or she reasonably
believes that force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to
himself or a third person as a result of the other's imminent use of unlawful
force, or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.
(2) A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances specified
in Subsection (1) if he or she:
(c) (i) was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by agreement,
unless he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to the
other person his intent to do so and, notwithstanding, the other person
continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful force;
(5) In determining imminence or reasonableness under Subsection (1), the
trier of fact may consider, but is not limited to, any of the following factors:
(d) the other's prior violent acts or violent propensities....
Price claimed to have employed only that force necessary to protect himself from
death or serious injury in a fight started by Armijo. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1),
(2)(c)(i) (2004). Price testified Armijo started the fight by approaching him and Gillett
from behind and hitting him several times before he could respond. (R. 132, at 342:5-
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343:24.) Price testified that he hit and twice kicked Armijo because he was afraid Armijo
was going to attack him just as had occurred earlier that day, and that he stopped fighting
as soon as the danger had dissipated. (E.g., R. 132, at 346:4-347:22.) Price was afraid to
the point of concluding that he had no option but to fight. (R. 132, at 350:8-20.) In fact,
Price believed he had been more seriously injured than Armijo during the final
altercation. (R. 132, at 348:6-12.) Whether Price went too far was a key issue argued to
the jury. (R. 132, at 407:21-24 [Price's attorney: "If in fact there was a blow that was
too far, which one was it?"]; id, at 410:21-24 [the state: "There's no reason to believe
that Tom [Armijo] was going to be - this force was necessary for Mr. Armijo to prevent
the death or serious bodily injury to himself or Adam [Price] or Jared [Gillett] or a third
person"].)
So central to Price's self defense claim was evidence of Armijo's violent acts and
propensities, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(5)(d) (2004), that Price's attorney and the
state discussed before trial Price's desire to introduce evidence of Armijo's assault
convictions. The state offered no objection provided that something more than a rap sheet
was available to prove up the convictions. (R. 131, at 120:21-122:24.)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(5)(d) (2004)(the trier of fact may consider the other's
violent acts or violent propensities) effectively designates the victim's violent character as
a key element to a self-defense claim. Pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 405(b), an essential
element of a defense may be established through evidence of specific instances of
conduct. While decided under the predecessors of Utah R. Evid. 404 and 405, Utah case
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law expressly permits a defendant claiming self defense to introduce evidence of the
victim's prior criminal convictions:
Because the defendant's defense of self defense placed the issue of
deceased's character in evidence, defendant was entitled to prove the
turbulent and violent character of the deceased. Evidence of a victim's
turbulent and violent character is relevant to prove that the deceased may
have been the aggressor, or that defendant, if he knew of those character
traits, was fearful of the deceased.
This State, however, has opted for a more limited type of evidence than
[sic] can be used to prove specific instances of misconduct. To prevent the
trial from being drawn off into pathways collateral to the central issue of
guilt, Rules 46 and 47 of Utah Rules of Evidence do not permit evidence of
specific acts of violence, short of criminal conviction, to prove the
deceased's violent character. [Footnote omitted.] In addition to evidence of
a criminal conviction, reputation evidence of a victim's character may also
be adduced.
State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 96 (Utah 1982); State v. Clayton, 658 P.2d 624, 626 (Utah
1983)(same).2

2

Alternatively, Armijo's violent character was also admissible pursuant to Utah R. Evid.
404(b). Under that rule, evidence of prior bad acts may be admissible for purposes other
than conforming behavior. In this case, Armijofs prior assault convictions were probative
of similarity to the instant incident. In addition, other aspects of Rule 404(b)fs
requirement were also met. First, the prosecutor was on notice that defense counsel was
going to use the convictions. (R: 131, at 122.) Second, Armijo's prior assault convictions
are relevant under Utah R. Evid. 401, in that they tended "to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of [self-defense] more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." Third, though Armijo's prior
misdemeanor convictions would normally be inadmissible under Rule 404(b), Utah Code
Ann. §76-2-402(5)(d) allows a trier of fact to consider a victim's prior violent acts or
violent propensities when determining the reasonableness of force in self-defense. See
discussion, supra. Most importantly, the very nature of Armijo's violent propensities
renders the probative value of his prior assault convictions more probative than
prejudicial under Utah R. Evid. 403.
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But, as the state had warned Price's attorney prior to trial, and as the attorney
should have known in any event, evidence of a criminal conviction must come in through
either the convicted person or a certified copy of the conviction. Utah R. Evid. 902(4);
State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387, 1390 (Utah 1977)(best evidence of a conviction is a
record of the conviction); State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 549-550 (Utah
1966)(strict compliance with requirement of certification by records custodian required
when introducing evidence of prior criminal conviction), citing State v. Long, 721 P.2d
483, 486 (Utah 1986)(same); State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342, 345-346 (Utah 1980)(same;
quoting Rule 68(1), the predecessor to Rule 902(4)).
The weighing provisions of Utah R. Evid. 403 (probative value versus unfair
prejudice or confusion) also relates to Price's attorney's apparent intent to introduce a
"rap sheet" into evidence. A rap sheet typically summarizes arrests, charges and criminal
dispositions. It may well include information about arrests and charges that did not result
in convictions, or that resulted in convictions irrelevant to the matter at hand. No
reasonable attorney would expect such information to be received into evidence.
When the data read from the rap sheet failed to refresh Mr. Armijo's recollection
of the three convictions for violent offenses, Price's attorney made no attempt to further
impeach Armijo or to introduce into evidence the rap sheet. He simply asked Armijo a
few more questions about another incident. (R. 131, at 124:9-11.) Price's attorney
informed the court that he may call Armijo in Price's case-in-chief the following day, and
the court advised Armijo: "Mr. Armijo. you're free to leave but they may get in touch
with you and ask you to come back later on." (R. 131, at 130:14-24.)
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Price's attorney knew that getting evidence of Armijo's prior convictions to the
jury was crucial to Price's defense. That is why he discussed this very issue with the
state prior to trial. The attorney knew the state would object if he attempted to get the rap
sheet into evidence. He knew or should have known that the record of any conviction
moved into evidence must comply with the certification requirements of Rule 902(4).
Yet, he undertook cross-examination of the most important prosecution witness armed
with naught but a rap sheet. As a result, with Armijo's claims of living a life of peace
and love fresh in the jury's ears, Price's attorney was unable to prove up three
convictions for violent behavior.
This was not a tactical decision. Price had given Armijo the opportunity of
admitting to the assault convictions, but Armijo frustrated this attempt by feigning an
inability to read the rap sheet and then by denying any recollection of the three
convictions. Moreover, Price's attorney did introduce authenticated evidence the next
day - albeit evidence of but one of the three convictions.
2. Failed to Ensure Armijo's Presence.
All was not lost, however, as the trial court warned Armijo he could again be
called as a witness. (R. 131, at 130:14-24.) Indeed, Armijo came to the courthouse the
second morning of trial. (R. 132, at 326:13-16 [Det. Nelson, the state's case manager
below, spoke with Armijo that morning].) But Armijo did not get "a communication"
from Price's attorney, so he left. (R. 132, at 326:13-19.)
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Pursuant to the trial court's instruction, Armijo was right outside the courtroom the
second morning of trial. All Price's attorney had to do was stick his head outside the door
and say, "Stick around." But he did not. Armijo left because of the attorney's failure.
This was not a tactical decision. Had Price's attorney not intended to call Armijo,
he would not have told the court the first day of trial, in the presence of the jury, that he
might do so in Price's case-in-chief; nor would Price's attorney have told the court just
before lunch the second day of trial, also in the presence of the jury, that was calling
Armijo back to the stand, then actually leaving the courtroom to look for him.
3. Failed to Request a Continuance.
Without Armijo, the best Price's attorney could do was show the video tape of
Armijo reading from a hearing transcript the day before to impeach his claimed inability
to read the rap sheet, and to introduce certified copies of the three convictions. As noted
in Section B, infra, these are, at best, poor seconds when compared to exposing a key
witness's untruths before a jury. Price's attorney, therefore, should have requested a
continuance.
Granting a continuance is within the sound discretion of the court. E.g., State v.
Mooseman, 542 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Utah 1975). In this case, however, sending someone
out to fetch Armijo to testify later that afternoon, or telling him to appear the next
morning, would have cost little more than slight inconvenience in exchange for
immeasurable gain. Moreover, had the trial court refused the attorney's request, the issue
would at least have been reserved for appeal.
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Rather than request a continuance, however, Price's attorney simply proceeded to
show the snippet of video that showed Armijo reading the day before - without any
comment as to the video's significance; and he introduced into evidence one certified
copy of one conviction - also without any comment as to its significance.
To proceed without Armijo can hardly be called a strategic choice. Price's
attorney, after all, believed calling Armijo was important enough to have the trial court
order Armijo to make himself available the following day. Price's attorney then stopped
the proceedings the second day of trial to exit the courtroom looking for Armijo.
4. Failed to Question the Case Manager about Armijo's Departure.
Detective Nelson, the state's case manager at trial, is certainly an agent of the
prosecution team. He was the only prosecution witness allowed to remain when all other
witnesses but the defendants were excluded.
When an agent of the state interferes with defense counsel's ability to protect the
defendant's fundamental rights under the Sixth Amendment, ineffective assistance is
presumed. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.25 (1984).
In the case at bar, Armijo and Det. Nelson spoke at the courthouse the second
morning of trial. Armijo apparently gave Det. Nelson a note - although counsel's failure
to make a record of the note's contents prevents any consideration thereof. (R., 132, at
326:7-23.) Entirely plausible is that Det. Nelson spoke with Armijo in a manner that led
to Armijo's departure before Armijo could be called to the stand where his credibility and

21

peaceful character were sure to be attacked. Had Det. Nelson played any such role, a
presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel would arise. See Strickland, supra.
Price was entitled to an attorney that would at least ask what role Det. Nelson
played in Armijo's untimely departure. The questioning could have occurred as witness
voir dire, without calling the jury back in, and would have required only two or three
minutes. No conceivable tactical advantage was gained from failing to question Det.
Nelson, or in requesting that the court inquire into the specifics of Armijo's departure,
outside the presence of the jury.
5. Failed to Secure Certified Copies of Two of the Three Convictions.
Armijo's rap sheet disclosed three convictions for assault. They were dated April
24, 1992, October 18, 1991, and November 4, 1992. Even though Armijo was not there
to confront personally with the three convictions, at least Price's attorney could admit into
evidence a certified copy of each conviction.
But the only certified copy of a conviction offered into evidence was for the
October 18, 1991 offense. (Def. Ex. 4.) Price's attorney had failed to get certified copies
of the other two convictions.
The state had no objection to the other convictions coming in provided they were
evidenced by authenticated records. The court would have let them in, as evidenced by
its receipt of Defendant's Exhibit 4, especially absent objection by the state attorney. The
only person who prevented their introduction was Price's attorney - because he failed to
get authenticated copies.

22

This was not a tactical decision. Just the day before, Price's attorney sought to
secure testimony regarding all three assault convictions. No advantage was gained by
introducing just one of the three convictions.
6. Failed to Tie the Video and Single Conviction to Armijo's Credibility and
Character.
At least Price's attorney still had the opportunity to attack the key prosecution
witness's credibility during closing argument.
The jury had seen Armijo refresh his recollection from a hearing transcript both in
person and via the brief video clip. But tying that evidence to Armijo's lack of credibility
would require the attorney's explanation because the video had previously been played
without any accompanying comment or explanation. (R. 132, at 336:25-337:14.)
The jury would have before it the certified copy of a single assault conviction.
(Def. Ex. 4.) Again, tying that evidence to Armijo's lack of credibility would require the
attorney's explanation during closing argument because the exhibit was received and
published without any accompanying comment or testimony. (R. 132, at 336:2-16.)
Price's attorney, however, mentioned the video tape once - with but a cryptic
reference to its significance:
So we know he's violent and that he struck first and we know that he had a
violent history although he conveniently couldn't read - he could read when
Mr. Hogan [co-defense counsel] presented something to him and we saw
that on the videotape, but conveniently, he couldn't read when I was
presenting that to him.
(R. 132, at 403:13-18.) Price's attorney did not once mention Defendant's Exhibit 4, the
certified copy of the conviction, or the conviction itself.
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Failing to tie visual, tangible evidence to the key witness's lack of credibility and
violent propensities cannot be called a tactical decision. Price's attorney did mention
these issues, although most ineffectively. Moreover, Price's attorney was not concerned
about having too little time in which to present his closing arguments. When the trial
court, upon the state's request, extended from twenty to thirty minutes the time for each
attorney present his argument, Price's attorney responded, "I don't need 30 minutes, Your
Honor." (R. 132, at 330:3-17.)
B.

But for Counsel's deficient Performance There Is a Reasonable Probability
that the Outcome Would Have Been Different
Price's attorney's failure to attack either the credibility of the most important

prosecution witness when the entire case turned on credibility, or the witness's selfanointment as a peaceful and non-aggressive man when the witness's violent character
was a central issue to Price's self-defense claim, likely affected the outcome of the trial.
See Montoya. 2004 UT 5, % 23, quoting Wickham, 2002 UT 72, ^ 19.
The attorney's most significant failures lay in not having ready the certified copies
of the convictions the first day of trial, not ensuring Armijo's presence the second day of
trial, and obtaining admissible evidence of only one of Armijo's three prior assault
charges. Taken together, however, the mistakes detailed above (Section A, subsections 16), had the likely effect of cementing his client's conviction.
Constitutional due process of law is not satisfied where perjured testimony of a
material witness is likely to have affected the jury's judgment. "Particularly is this true
where the testimony of that witness was crucial in establishing proof of the elements of
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the crime charged and the overall circumstances of the testimony offered bore directly on
the guilt or innocence of the commission of the crime itself...." United States v.
Guillette, 404 F.Supp. 1360, 1369-70 (D. Conn. 1975). In the case at bar, Armijo's was
the only direct testimony probative of the elements of assault, and it was the only direct
testimony offered to rebut Price's self defense claim.
An inability to exploit a key witness's falsehoods may warrant a new trial. See
United States v. Pacelli, 491 F.2d 1108, 1119 (2d Cir. 1974) new trial ordered where
prosecution failed to disclose evidence relevant to impeaching material witness's
credibility), cert denied 419 U.S. 826, and 424 U.S. 911 (1976). The right to confront
one's accusers is vital to the truth-seeking process:
When confrontation is available the accused has an opportunity, not only of
testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of
compelling him to stand face-to-face with the jury in order that they may
look at him and judge by his demeanor and the manner in which he gives his
testimony whether he is worth of belief. [Footnote omitted.]
State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 785 (Utah 1980).
In Guillette, supra, the credibility of the government's informant was constantly
under attack. His recollection of key events differed from law enforcement officers, and
differed as well from other proven credible evidence. Some particulars of his testimony
were nothing short of "fantastic." 404 F.Supp. at 1371. Thus it could not be said that the
informant's credibility was anywhere close to pure to begin with. Nonetheless, there was
additional evidence that would have reflected upon the informant's credibility that the
government failed to disclose, including evidence of a psychiatric disorder and ten checks
on which the informant signed his name in a manner slightly different from how he
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described his signature under cross examination. Id., at 1371-72. In language especially
relevant to Price's attorney's failure to nail down Armijo's violent tendencies and lack of
credibility, the Guillette court observed:
Experience teaches trial counsel that one of the most dangerous witnesses is
one who has no hesitancy to Till in' crucial testimony or to tell half-truths.
A supplement to that theorem, however, teaches that the testimony of such a
witness can be totally destroyed where adequate background information
concerning the witness has been developed and a thorough preparation of
the fads carried out.
Id, at 1371.
Armijo was the only witness to claim Price started the altercations back at the
house earlier that day. He is the only witness to accuse Price and Gillett of later attacking
him in front of the pool hall. By contrast, both Price and Gillett testified that Armijo
initiated the fLnal altercation with verbal threats and then by actually hitting Price several
times before Price could respond. (R. 132, at 342:1-343:24 [Price]; R. 132, at 287:16-22
[Gillett].) Even when interviewed separately by Det. Nelson shortly after their respective
arrests the night of the altercation (the videotaped interviews were shown to the jury),
both Price and Gillett stated they were attacked by Armijo. (R. 132, at 405:21-24.) It was
Armijo's word against Price and Gillett's, and credibility was the key.
Armijo's claims to be a man of peace may well have struck the jury as "halftruths." See Guillette, 404 F.Supp. at 1371. Especially telling was Armijo's plaintiff
query when counsel approached him with the rap sheet immediately following Armijo's
declaration that he was not a violent or aggressive man: "Can he do that?" (R. 131, at
103:13.) That was when an attorney equipped with three certified convictions could have
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shown Armijo for the untruthful, violent man he is. That was when the jury would have
seen Armijo falter. That is when the jury should have been allowed to critically evaluate
Armijo5s lonely claim that it was he who was attacked and he who was immediately
rendered defenseless.
But, of course, that never happened. Because it never happened, Price was
convicted of aggravated assault.
CONCLUSION
Because Price did not receive effective assistance of counsel, the aggravated
assault conviction should be reversed, and the matter remanded for a new trial.

DATED t h i s / / # W of July, 2005.

John Pace
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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Addendum A

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs .

Case No: 041903671 FS

ADAM KYLE PRICE,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

ROBIN W. REESE
March 14, 2005

PRESENT
Clerk:
marlened
Prosecutor: HILLS, BLAKE R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): SIMMS, CLAYTON A
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: December 27, 1983
Video
Tape Number:
TAPE
Tape Count- 10:45
CHARGES
1. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - 2nd Degree Felony
Disposition: 01/10/2005 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
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Case No: 041903671
Date:
Mar 14, 2005

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s)
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine: $18500.00
Suspended: $18500.00

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due-

$18500.00
$18500.00
$0
$0
Plus Interest

SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Restitution:
Amount: $11693.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: UNKNOWN
ORDER OF

PROBATION

The defendant is placed on probation for 3 year(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant to serve 365 day(s) jail.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any
Law Enforcement Officel.
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or
illegal drugs.
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law
Enforcement Officer.
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Case No: 041903671
Date:
Mar 14, 2005
Violate no laws.
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole.
Pay restitution as determined by Probation Officer.
PAY $11,693.00 RESTITUTION
NO CONTACT WITH VICTIM
MAINTAIN STABLE RESIDENCE
MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH AP&P
SERVE 3 65 DAYS JAIL
COMPLETE IN-PATIENT PROGRAM / AND AFTERCARE
COMPLETE ANGER MANAGEMENT COUNSELING
COMPLETE MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELING
FOLLOW ALL PROBATION PROGRAMS
Dated this

day of

, 20

.

ROBIN W. REESE
District Court Judge
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Third District Court, State of Utah
SALT LAKE COUNTY COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
450 South State Street, P O Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860
SENTENCE/JUDGMB:NT/COMMITMENT/ORDER
Criminal/Traffic
CI(TY/STATE'
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Case Number^"" Cf I ' / ? * " ^ 6
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,

Judge/Comm

r
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S
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Amended

at

Amended
fHE COURT SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT AS FOLLOWS: J ~ / ? 1/7 *°
1) Jail

Suspended

Defendant to Commence Serving Jail Sentence
2) FineAmt $

Susp $

JV0>

7*

Fee$

Fine Bal $
TOTAL FINE(S) DUE $

Payment Schedule: Pay $
3) Court Costs

per month/1 st Pmt Due

Last Pmt Due

$

X) Community Service/WP.
>) Restitution

& fixi

through
(

Pay to
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^^***T-

Attorney Fees $ I
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>) Probation ^

•
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• Other

r
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0 N o Further Violations
•

AA Meetings
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D Follow Program
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Health Testing

G Crime Lab Procedure

D Employment
D Proof of
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i Review
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compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals
xJing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative
s and services) during this proceeding should call Third District
jrt at 238-7500 at least three working days prior to the proceeding

/
District Court Judge

APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF JUDGMENT
INTEREST WILL BE ADDED IF FINE AND/OR RESTITUTION NOT PAID IN FULL TODAY

Addendum B

3RD DISTRICT COURT - WV DEPT.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST VALLEY CITY vs. TOM ARMIJO
E NUMBER 911001218 Other Misdemeanor
RGES
Charge 1 - 76-5-102 - SIMPLE ASSAULT
Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: October 18, 1991 Guilty
Disposition: October 18, 1991 {Guilty Plea}
1RENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
WILLIAM A. THORNE
ITIES

3TATE0FUTAH
t
COUNTY OF SALT UKE f S t

Defendant - TOM ARMIJO
1912 W 3395 S
WVC, UT 84119
hand*

Plaintiff -

WEST VALLEY CITY

^ ^ ^ T ^ k
PENDANT INFORMATION
Defendant Name: TOM ARMIJO
Offense tracking number:
Date of Birth: November 01, 1964
Social Security Number:
Driver License Number: 149512590
Driver License State: UT
Law Enforcement Agency: WEST VALLEY POLICE
Prosecuting Agency: WEST VALLEY CITY
Agency Case Number: WVP
Citation Number: A801822
Violation Date: April 03, 1991
'COUNT SUMMARY

2 DEFENDANT'S
I
EXHIBIT

V-

LSE NOTE

IOCEEDINGS
1-04-91 Information filed
1-04-91 Judge THORNE assigned.
1-09-91 Arraignment scheduled on April 09, 1991 at 09:00 AM in SECOND
FLOOR with Judge THORNE.

rinted: 01/06/05 16:10:03
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convert
convert

ASE

.MUMBER

4-09-91
4-09-91
4-09-91
4-09-91
4-09-91
4-09-91
1-09-91
1-09-91
$-19-91
.-19-91
-19-91
-05-91

-05-91
-05-91
-05-91
-05-91
-17-91
-18-91
-18-91
18-91
18-91
18-91
18-91
18-91
18-91
18-91
18-91

911001218 O t h e r Misdemeanor

Judge William A Thorne
janicec
Note Mis Arr
TAPE: 8 740
COUNT: 0580
janicec
Note
Deft present w/o counsel
janicec
Note
Defendant advised of rights and waived.
janicec
Note
Note DEF PG. ON COURTS OWN MOTION, PLEA TO BE HELD IN ABEYANCE
FOR
janicec
Note: 12 MONTHS WITH PROB TO COURT. TERMS: l.NO OTHER
VIOLATIONS
j anicec
Note: 2.COMPLETE CCC
MATTER MAY BE DISMISSED ON WRITTEN
MOTION
janicec
Note: Began tracking Diversion
Review on
03/09/92
janicec
Warrant ordered on: August 19, 1991 Warrant Num: 911007111 Bail
Allowed
Bail amount:
8 0 0.00
Note: FILED: STAY REPORT CCC
maryl
Note: WAT/MEL C/O B/W $800
maryl
Warrant issued on: September 05, 1991 Warrant Num: 911007111
Bail Allowed
Bail amount:
800,00
Judge: WILLIAM A. THORNE
Issue reason: The defendant failed to comply with the
terms of probations as alleged in the Order to Show Cause.
Note: BENCH WARRANT batch issued - JUDGE WAT Issued - 09/05/91janicec
janicec
Note Failure to comply with probation
Bail amount ordered:
800.00
janicec
Note
Warrant fee:
janicec
Note
Arraignment scheduled on October 18, 1991 at 08:31 AM in SECOND
FLOOR with Judge THORNE.
loris
Warrant recalled on: October 18, 1991 Warrant num: 911007111
Recall reason: Based on the probable cause statement.
Note: WAT/JFC T9283 C1027 DPWOC. DEF FAILED TO COMPLETE
COUNSELING AT
janicec
Note: CCC. DEF INDICATES WHEN HE SPOKE WITH CCC REPRESENTATIVE
AT ARR,
janicec
Note: THEY INDICATED CCC HAD A DRUG COUNSELING PROGRAM TEAT
WOULD BE
janicec
Note: BENSFICIAL TO HIM AS HE FELT THE ALST WAS DUE TO HIS DRUG
PROBLjanicec
Note: EM. WHEN HE WENT TO CCC HE WAS TOLD THERE WASNT A DRUG
PROGRAM
janicec
Note: FOR HIM. C/O PLEA TO BE ENTERED TODAY, SENT IMPOSED: 180
DAYS
janicec
Note: JAL, $1000 FINE. SUSP BOTH JAIL AND FINE ON HAVING AN
ASSESSMENT
j anicec
Note: AT OLYMPUS VIEW HOSPITAL AND FOLLOW THRU WITH ALL
RECOMMENDATION
j anicec
Note: OF OLYMPUS VIEW. DEF TO PROVIDE LETTER OF ENROLLMENT
WITHIN 30
janicec

ited: 01/06/05 16:10:03
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NUMBER 911001218 Other Misdemeanor

L8--91 Note: DAYS
L8--91 Note: Began tracking

janicec
Fine Stay

Review on

Probation (Court)

Review on

11/18/91

L8--91 Note: Began tracking

janicec

08/11/92

L8--91 Note: Chrg: 76-5-102 Plea: Guilty Find: Guilty Plea
12--91 Note: FILED; LETTER FROM OLYMPUS VIEW, C/O 1 THRU 5 TO BE
INCORPORTED

janicec
janicec
vickiem

12--91 Note: INTO PROB TERMS. ON LETTER. 1. OUT-PATIIENT CHEMICAL
DEPENDENCY

vickiem

12--91 Note: TREATMENT AT VMH, 2. INDIVIDUAL OUT-PATIENT COUNSELING A
12--91
12--91
12--91
09--92
24--92
24--92
24--92
04--92
04--92
•04--92
-04--92
-09--92

VMH.
vickiem
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Addendum C

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AMENDMENTS
AMENDMENT 6
USCS Const. Amend. 6 (2005)

Rights of the accused.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

Addendum D

Utah Const. Art. I, §12
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 2005 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2004 FOURTH SPECIAL SESSION ***
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2005 UT 7, 2005 UT APP 37 ***
*** AND JANUARY 27, 2005 (FEDERAL CASES) ***
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
ARTICLE I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

Utah Const. Art. I, § 12 (2005)
§12. [Rights of accused persons.]

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that
examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided
by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as
defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine
probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
HISTORY: Const. 1896; L. 1994, S.J.R. 6, § 1.
NOTES:
AMENDMENT NOTES. - T h e 1994 amendment was proposed by Laws 1994, SJ.R. 6, § 1 ,
approved by the voters on November 8, 1994, and took effect on January 1 , 1995. The
amendment added the second paragraph.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 2005 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2004 FOURTH SPECIAL SESSION ***
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2005 UT 7, 2005 UT APP 37 ***
*** AND JANUARY 27, 2005 (FEDERAL CASES) ***
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 2. PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
PART 4. JUSTIFICATION EXCLUDING CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 76^2-402 (2005)
§ 76-2-402. Force in defense of person — Forcible felony defined

(1) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to the extent
that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend himself or a third person
against such other's imminent use of unlawful force. However, that person is justified in using
force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury only if he or she reasonably
believes that force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or a third
person as a result of the other's imminent use of unlawful force, or to prevent the commission of
a forcible felony.
(2) A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances specified in Subsection (1) if
he or she:
(a) initially provokes the use of force against himself with the intent to use force as an excuse
to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant;
(b) is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commission or attempted
commission of a felony; or
(c) (i) was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by agreement, unless he withdraws from
the encounter and effectively communicates to the other person his intent to do so and,
notwithstanding, the other person continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful force;
and
(ii) for purposes of Subsection (i) the following do not, by themselves, constitute "combat by
agreement":

(A) voluntarily entering into or remaining in an ongoing relationship; or
(B) entering or remaining in a place where one has a legal right to be.
(3) A person does not have a duty to retreat from the force or threatened force described in
Subsection (1) in a place where that person has lawfully entered or remained, except as provided
in Subsection (2)(c).
(4) For purposes of this section, a forcible felony includes aggravated assault, mayhem,
aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, and aggravated kidnapping, rape, forcible
sodomy, rape of a child, object rape, object rape of a child, sexual abuse of a child, aggravated
sexual abuse of a child, and aggravated sexual assault as defined in Title 76, Chapter 5, and
arson, robbery, and burglary as defined in Title 76, Chapter 6. Any other felony offense which
involves the use of force or violence against a person so as to create a substantial danger of death
or serious bodily injury also constitutes a forcible felony. Burglary of a vehicle, defined in
Section 76-6-204, does not constitute a forcible felony except when the vehicle is occupied at the
time unlawful entry is made or attempted.
(5) In determining imminence or reasonableness under Subsection (1), the trier of fact may
consider, but is not limited to, any of the following factors:
(a) the nature of the danger;
(b) the immediacy of the danger;
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or serious bodily injury;
(d) the other's prior violent acts or violent propensities; and
(e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties' relationship.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 76-2-402, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-402; 1974, ch. 32, § 6;
1991, ch. 10, §5; 1994, ch. 26, § 1.
NOTES:
LEGISLATIVE INTENT. -Laws 1994, ch. 26, § 2 provides: "Amendments made by this act to
Section 76-2-402, regarding self defense, are intended to clarify that justification of the use
of force in defense of a person applies equally to all persons including victims of abuse in
ongoing relationships. It is intended that otherwise competent evidence regarding a victim's
response to patterns of domestic abuse or violence be considered by the trier of fact in
determining imminence or reasonableness in accordance with that section, and that the
evidence be considered when useful in understanding the perceptions or conduct of a
witness."
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URE Rule 405
UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 2005 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All Rights Reserved
* THIS DOCUMENT IS CURRENT THROUGH CHANGES RECEIVED AS OF MARCH 1,
2005*
* Annotations current through 2004 UT 97, 2004 UT 418, and December 1, 2004 *
STATE RULES
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS
URE Rule 405 (2005)
Rule 405. Methods of proving character.
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a
person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the
form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of
conduct.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of
that person's conduct.
HISTORY: Amended effective October 1, 1992
NOTES:
Advisory Committee Note. -- This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is consistent with
Rule 4 6 , Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) and the decisions of the Utah Supreme Court. Cf.
State v. Howard, 544 P.2d 466 (Utah 19751. Rule 47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971)
appears to be covered by subdivisions (a)(1) or (b) of Rule 404.

Addendum G

State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Ryan D. Nelson, Defendant and Appellant.
CaseNo.20010753-CA
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH
2004 UT App 421; 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 489

November 18, 2004, Filed
NOTICE: [*1] NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION
PRIOR HISTORY: Fourth District, Provo Department. The Honorable Gary D. Stott.
DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded.
COUNSEL: Margaret P. Lindsay, Orem, and Michael D. Esplin, Provo, for Appellan.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Brett J. DelPorto, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
JUDGES: James Z. Davis, Judge. WE CONCUR: Norman H. Jackson, Judge, William A.
Thorne Jr., Judge.
OPINIONBY: James Z. Davis
OPINION: MEMORANDUM DECISION
Before Judges Davis, Jackson, and Thorne.
DAVIS, Judge:
Defendant Ryan D. Nelson appeals his conviction of forcible sodomy, a first degree felony. We
reverse.
Defendant argues that his trial counsel's failure to file the required statutory notice of alibi, see
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-2 (2003), constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. / / w ¥ T o prevail
on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must establish that "(1) counsel's
performance was deficient below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and
(2) counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, P 16. 26
P.3d203; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct.
2052(1984).
It is [*2] undisputed that Defendant's trial counsel failed to comply with section 77-14-2 and
that, as a result, the trial court did not allow two of Defendant's alibi witnesses to testify at trial.
We conclude that this failure constituted performance that "was deficient below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment." Martinez, 2001 UT 12 at P 16. Therefore,

Defendant has established the first prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel.
/A2

?To establish the second prong, Defendant must "'show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.'" Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, P 31, 44 P.3d 626 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694). The State argues that the testimony of Defendant's two alibi witnesses "could not have
affected the outcome of the trial" because those witnesses would have testified about Defendant's
whereabouts on a day other than the one when the alleged incident occurred. The State asserts
that the alleged incident occurred [*3] on the "afternoon of August 3, 2000" and that the two
alibi witnesses would have testified about Defendant's whereabouts on August 4, 2000. This
argument is without merit and is unsupported by the record.
The record contains the affidavits of both alibi witnesses, which provide, as the State correctly
asserts, that if they had been allowed to testify at trial, both would have testified about
Defendant's whereabouts on August 4, 2000. However, the record does nol indicate that August
3, 2000 is the only date relevant to the alleged incident. On the contrary, after reviewing the
record, it is clear that August 4, 2000 was within the time period the State believed the alleged
incident occurred, nl As such, the testimony of the two alibi witnesses concerning Defendant's
whereabouts on August 4, 2000 would have been relevant to Defendant's alibi defense. n2 This is
particularly true where the only alibi witness who was allowed to testify at trial — Defendant's
father — provided inconsistent testimony and was Defendant's blood relative. The jury may well
have assigned more credibility to Defendant's alibi defense had the two additional alibi witnesses
been allowed to testify. Moreover, [*4] our review of the record indicates that, contrary to the
State's assertion, there is not overwhelming evidence of Defendant's guilt. Accordingly, we
conclude that '"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's [failure to comply with
section 77-14-21, the result of the proceeding would have been different."' Galetka, 2001 UT 96
at P 31 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Therefore, Defendant has established the second
prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel.
-

Footnotes

nl The information charging Defendant provides that the alleged incident occurred "on or about
August 04, 2000." In addition, during the prosecutor's opening statement at trial, he referenced
the information and indicated that the alleged incident occurred "on or about August 4 of the
year 2000." Further, the instructions to the jury indicated that the alleged incident occurred "on
or about August 4, 2000."
n2 On remand from our order pursuant to rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
trial court also found that the testimony of the two alibi witnesses "was relevant to the issues
presented at trial and to the defense presented by the Defendant."

- - End Footnotes

+

[*5]

Defendant has successfully established thai he received ineffective assistance of counsel. n3

Therefore, we reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial.
— Footnotes

n3 Because Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is dispositive of his appeal, we
need not address his remaining arguments. However, we note his argument that the trial court
erred by inflexibly applying Utah Code section 77-14-2 to conclude that Defendant's two alibi
witnesses could not testify. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-2 (2003). Section 77-14-2 provides that
if a party fails to comply with its requirements, a trial court has discretion to exclude alibi
evidence, but is not required to do so. See id. § 77-14-2(3), (4) (providing that if a party fails to
comply with the requirements of section 77-14-2, the court "may exclude evidence offered to
establish or rebut alibi," or "for good cause shown, waive the requirements o f section 77-14-2
(emphasis added)); State v. Ortiz, 712 P.2d 218, 219-20 (Utah 1985) (stating that the thrust of
section 77-14-2 "is to allow a court, for good cause, to permit alibi testimony that has not been
properly noticed," and that "the overriding consideration in evaluating any notice-of-alibi claim
must be the avoidance of unfair surprise or prejudice to either party, not an exaltation of
technical formalities"). While not clearly apparent from the record, it appears as though the trial
court may have failed to exercise any discretion in its application of section 77--14-2. However, it
also appears that this failure is intertwined with, and likely the result of, the ineffective assistance
Defendant received from his trial counsel. Accordingly, we resolve Defendant's appeal based
upon his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

- End Footnotes

James Z. Davis, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
William A. Thome Jr., Judge

Addendum H

2004 UTApp 351; 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 365, *
State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Blake Bleazard, Defendant and Appellant.
CaseNo.20030402-CA
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH
2004 UT App 351; 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 365

October 7, 2004, Filed
NOTICE: [*1] NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION
PRIOR HISTORY: Third District, Salt Lake Department. The Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs
DISPOSITION: Reversed.
COUNSEL: Gregory G. Skordas and Jack M. Morgan, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Matthew D. Bates, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
JUDGES: Judith M. Billings, Presiding Judge. I CONCUR: James Z. Davis, Judge, Gregory K.
Orme, Judge (concurring in the result)
OPINIONBY: Judith M. Billings
OPINION:
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Orme.
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
Defendant Blake Bleazard appeals his conviction of rape, a first degree felony. See Utah Code
Ann. $ 76-5-402 (1999). We reverse.
At trial, the sole issue was whether the sexual intercourse was consensual. On appeal, Defendant
argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. //A/"?"A11 criminal defendants have a
right to effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L.
Ed. 2d 674.104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). "^TTo demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, "the
defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient," and "that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense." Id. Counsel's performance [*2] is measured by "an
objective standard of reasonableness," id. at 688, and the resulting prejudice is measured by
whether there would have been a reasonable probability of a different result "sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694.
Defendant argues that trial counsel's failure to present testimony from two potential witnesses —
James and Brandy Lefler (the Leflers) — at trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, nl
Defendant's trial counsel subpoenaed the Leflers, but failed to provide adequate notice to the
State as required by rule 16(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, the trial
court refused 1o permit these witnesses to testify at trial. "^^Failure to provide adequate notice
clearly constitutes deficient performance on the part of Defendant's trial counsel, and thus the
issue is whether the absence of their testimony was prejudicial.
Footnotes - -

nl Defendant also claims that trial counsel made the same error for four additional witnesses;
however, given our disposition of this appeal, we need not address Defendant's additional claims.

End Footnotes

[*3]

The Leflers were prepared to testify that the victim had falsely accused James Lefler of rape
eight years earlier. This testimony would have been admissible to attack the credibility of the
victim under rule 608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence; because the outcome of the trial crucially
hinged upon whether the jury believed the victim's version of events, such testimony would have
been important to Defendant's defense at trial.
Defendant's trial counsel made an additional error. Defendant moved to exclude a videotape of
Defendant's police interview because it was highly prejudicial and its only relevance was to
show that Defendant had intercourse with the victim, a fact to which Defendant had stipulated.
Even if the Defendant's stipulation did not strip the videotape evidence of its relevance, see State
v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 475 (Utah 1988), 1he trial court considered the question of whether the
videotape's probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to be
a close call. See Utah R. Evid. 403.
While the trial court concluded that the videotape was admissible, it directed Defendant's counsel
to prepare a cautionary instruction [*4] to mitigate the prejudicial effect of inflammatory
comments on the videotape. Implicit in the trial court's direction to counsel is a recognition that
the videotape testimony, absent a cautionary instruction, was likely overly prejudicial. Trial
counsel's failure to prepare the instruction in these circumstances constituted deficient
performance.
Trial counsel's failure to provide the cautionary instruction, coupled with the absence of the
Leflers' testimony, resulted in prejudice sufficient to undermine our confidence in the jury's
verdict. Thus, Defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-94, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
We therefore reverse Defendant's conviction.

Judith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge
I CONCUR:
James Z. Davis, Judge
CONCURBY: James Z. Davis, Judge, Gregory K. Orme, Judge (concurring in the result)
CONCUR: I agree with my colleagues that the conviction should be reversed and the case
remanded for a new trial. I believe, however, that the pivotal error is more fundamental than a
mere failure to propound a cautionary instruction. In my view, even if the videotape was
admissible [*5] as substantive evidence and even if it had some marginal probative value
notwithstanding Defendant's consistent acknowledgment that he had consensual sex with his
friend, this minimal value was so thoroughly outweighed by the "danger of unfair prejudice" that
it was error for the court to have admitted it. Utah R. Evid. 403.1 believe our decision to reverse
the conviction should be premised on this basis.
I wish also to register a cautionary note for any retrial which might ensue on remand. It should
not be assumed that the main opinion represents "law of the case" to the effect that the videotape
may properly be admitted as substantive evidence, so long as an appropriate cautionary
instruction is given. On the contrary, this court has not validated the trial court's conclusion that
Defendant's stipulation did not render the videotape irrelevant. On the contrary, the majority
engages in "even i f analysis in treating the relevance question. In short, while it is clear form the
main opinion that even if the videotape may properly be admitted, defendant is entitled to a
cautionary instruction, it is not clear that the videotape actually is admissible. On retrial, the
State [*6] would be well-advised, if it feels the need to again introduce the videotape, to be
much more focused in explaining the rationale for such admission in a case where Defendant
chose not to testify, as is his right, while simultaneously acknowledging that he had sex with his
friend, albeit consensual sex, and nothing in his videotaped statement is to the contrary.

